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--IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WALTER L. DILLINGHAM,
\
Plaintiff-Appellant, (
vs.

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

\

Case No.

12835

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the
Third Judicial District Court, Honorable Joseph G.
Jeppson, presiding, denying appellant's writ of habeas
corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant's writ of habeas corpus was denied pursuant to findings of fact and conclusions of law made after
a hearing on appellant's petition.

2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APP.EAL
Respondent submits that the denial of appellant':
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Third Distrie!
Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

·walter

Louis Dillingham was sentenced to the Uhl
State Prison on November 9, 1964, after pleading
to a charge of grand larceny (R. 41, 44). He was repre·
sented by Blaine Hofeling, who conferred with him prior
to the preliminary hearing, was present at the preliminary
hearing (R. 48-49) and was also present when the guilt)
plea was entered on the charge of grand larceny (R. 49).
On his pleading guilty to grand larceny a burglary charge
was dropped. A transcript of these proceedings was un·
available because of the death of the judge and court re·
porter and inability of any other reporter to read th<
notes (R. 15-16, 52).

I
I

Mr. Dillingham filed no appeal from his sentence ano'
served over six years before filing a writ of habeas corpu'
in the Third District Court on November 26, 1971. Thi
court refused to grant the writ. His claim for relief ou,
appeal is twofold: 1. He claims his counsel was incom·
petent because he did not question him about evidence
allegedly seized illegally (R. 41); 2. He claims his plea
of guilty to the grand larceny charge was produced hi
"mental pressure" surrounding his entry into court iR

51).

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT
IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER
WAS ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED BY
COMPETENT COUNSEL.
The test for competency of counsel, as established
by this court, is fulfilled when an attorney manifests real
concern for the interests of his client so that his representation is not tantamount to a sham or pretense of an
appearance in the record. Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d
118, 449 P. 2d 241 (1969). Andreason v. Turner, 27 Utah
2d 182, 493 P. 2d 1278 (1972). Actions of counsel which
amount to "an oversight or a matter of strategy" are not
grounds for relief on habeas corpus. Andreason, supra.
And a competent counsel is presumed to have satisfied
his burden of properly advising his client:
"Where a person is represented by a member
of the bar in good standing; and where, insofar as
the record discloses, he represented the accused
in a diligent manner, it seems fair to assume that
he similarly fulfilled his duties in other respects
and advised him concerning his rights." Johnson
v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P. 2d 901 (1970).
Thus, where the alleged act of incompetence "is
something that ordinarily does not take place in court,
and the record is silent as to whether or not an attorney
did advise his client in that regard," there must be an
"affirmative showing" in the record that such act of incompetence actually occurred. Id. at 903.
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The petitioner in a habeas corpus heanng cau1es the
burden of "proving the grounds upon which he relies for
his release by evidence that is clear and convincing."
McGuffey v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P. 2d 16G
(1967).
Appellant m this case claims that he was not adequately represented by counsel. This stems from the
allegation that his counsel did not question him about the
allegedly illegal circumstances surrounding his arrest, seizure of incriminating evidence and statements made to
police without the benefit of counsel (R. 41). However,
the mere allegation that counsel was inadequate or incompetent, unsupported by clear and convincing evidence,
does not overcome his burden. There is no affirmative
shmving in this rcco;·d that his counsel neglected to question him concerning the alleged illegal search, seizure and
HE' h2s made' only a naked assertion of incompetence•.
The record indicates that appellant's attorney conferred with him on several occasions: -;ometime prior to
the preliminary hearing (R. 41 and 44); at the preliminary hearing (R. J,8-40); and at the entry of the guilt)'
plea to grand larceny (R. 40). Ha\·ing discussed the case
with appellant and hit\ ing participated in the prel:iminar\'
hearing, counsel was certainly aware of the nature of all
the evidence against. him. The fact that a burglary charge
was dropped indicates adivity by counsel on behalf of
his client in the form of plea bargaining. Not raising these
issues a;;; defenses was undoubtedly a matter of strategy,
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ur at worst, an oversight. Neither explanation establishes

incompetency of counsel, justifying the release on habeas
corpus. The record certainly indicates no sham, pretense
of an appearance in the record, or lack of real concern
for the client, and the district court was correct in finding
that appellant was adequately represented by competent
counsel.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN
FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA WAS INTELLIGENTLY, KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
Appellant originally pl2ad not guilty to grand larceny
and bmglary (R. 44) but changed his plea to guilty of
grand larcmy after consultation with his attorney (R.
47). Appellant claims, six years later, that this plea was
nol
and intelligently made because of "mental
pressure'' ''.rhich included being taken to court dressed in
iail cll)thes and being chained to a murderer, Mr. Holt.
The publicity surrounding Mr. Holt's entry into court
'ubif:'ctecl appellant to view by a multitude of spectators
and iwwsrncn. Appellant claims he plead guilty because
he clicln't know if any prospective jury members were in
ilw crnwd watching him ck1ined to the murderer (R. 51).
To be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntarily made
with a clear understanding of what the charge is. Strong
1. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P. 2d 323 (1969). Boykin
v. .4.lahama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969), cited by appellant, held

that a guilty plea is not presumed to be voluntary unless
the record affirmatively indicates a valid plea. But this
case has not been applied retroactively. Brady v. United
States, 397 U. S. 742, 748, n. 4 (1969). Arbuckle v. Turner
'
440 F. 2d 586 (10th Cir. 1970). The courts will grant
relief where a guilty plea was coerced by mental pressure,
but to justify relief that pressure must usually be directly
applied by agents of the state. Brady, supra, at 751.
Since a habeas corpus hearing is basically civil in
nature, the burden is on the petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the facts entitle him to
relief, and appeal from denial of the writ will be surveyed
in a light most favorable to the findings of the lower court.
Maxwell v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 163, 435 P. 2d 287, 288
( 1967) . The evidence presented in a trial court by a
habeas petitioner need not be taken as fact and the court
is not required to believe evidence where there is some
factor that "would reasonably justify refusal to accept it
as the facts, and this includes the self-interest of the wit·
ness." Strong, supra, 462 P. 2d at 324. Furthermore, re·
lief will not be granted where the record reveals that peti·
tioner's claim is frivolous. Klotz v. Turner, 23 Utah 2d
303, 462 P. 2d 705, 706 (1969).
Appellant's claim, six years after conviction, is based
on his subjective impressions and feelings. If such su!J.
jective feelings were allowed as evidence of involuntary
pleas, then a guilty man might always claim that some
privolous thing scared him into his plea. It would become
a loophole by which the guilty attempt to escape just

punishment. No one could ever disprove the truthfulness
of
a claim because it has a purely subjective basis.
In addition, there is nothing in the record to justify the
conclusion that the will of the appellant was overcome,
or that he had not intelligently made this plea after consultation with his attorney who was present at the courthouse. The alleged "mental pressure" here was due to
the appellant's subjective interpretation (R. 51) of fortuitous circumstances rather than to any objective design
by agents of the state to coerce a guilty plea.
The district court was entirely correct in finding that
the appellant had not sustained his burden and had not
shown that his guilty plea was coerced in any way.
CONCLUSION
The appellant has not established, with clear and
convincing evidence, that his trial counsel's representation 11.rnounted to a sham or pretense of appearance in the
record. Neither has appellant sustained his burden of
proving that the guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered.
The decision of the court below should be affirmed.
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